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NOTES
CY PRES IN PENNSYLVANIA
The Estates Act of 1947 should clear away much of the confusion surround-
ing the cy pres doctrine. It expressly repealed five inconsistent statutes relating to
the doctrine, and it embodied the O' pres law in section ten. Although it is not
the purpose of this article to trace the history of the law concerning cy pres in
Pennsylvania, it is necessary to examine the repealed statutes to a certain extent
in order to determine the elements necessary for the application of the doctrine
before the passage of the Estates Act. Then an attempt will be made to find out
how, if at all, the latest statute changed the previous concepts. It is also necessary
to look at past court decisions to determine the elements necessary for the applica-
tion of the doctrine previously. In addition, these cases are beneficial in another
respect; viz, to define terms used in thL latest legislative enactment.
The definition of cy pres, as given in recent cases,1 was announced in an
early case when the court' said, "The meaning of the doctrine of cy pres, as received
by us, is, that when a definite function or duty is to be performed, and it cannot
be done in exact conformity with the scheme of the person or persons who have
provided for it, it must be performed with as close approximation to that scheme
as reasonably practicable; and so, of course, it must be enforced." 2 The Restatement
of Trusts comments, "The expression indicates the idea that where the exact in-
tention of the settlor is not carried out, his intention is carried out 'as nearly as'
may be." 3 These definitions are general, and one must look to the statutes to find
out exactly what the doctrine means.
Before the Estates Act of 1947, the status of the law was in confusion,
primarily because the doctrine was enounced by five inconsistent statutes none of
which expressly repealed the other. To make matters worse, the first act was re-
enacted with minor amendments after three other acts were passed in the mean-
time. According to the rule of construction of statutes, an amendment to an act
which reenacts thi act amended is qualified by the intervening act just as the
original act was qualified by the intervening act. 4 Since the last statute previous
to the 1947 act was the amending act, there was confusion as to how much this
amendment affected the intervening statutes, one of which practically abandoned
cy pres. The first statute was passed in 1855,5 and it stated in effect that no dis-
position of property for religious, charitable, literary, or scientific use shall fail
for want of a trustee; or by Mason of the objects being indefinite, uncertain, or
ceasing; or depending upon the discretion of the last trustee; or being given in
perpetuity or in excess of the annual amount the charitable organization is allowed
1 Williams Estate, 353 Pa. 638, 46 A.2d 237 (1946); Connors v. Ahearn, 342 Pa. 5, 19
A.2d 388 (1941) ; Curran's Estate, 310 Pa. 434, 165 A. 842 (1933) ; Kramph's Estate, 228 Pa.
455, 77 A. 814 (1910).
2 Philadelphia v. Heirs of Girard, 45 Pa. 9 (1863).
3 Restatement, Trusts, § 399 (a) (1935).
4 Toner's Estate, 260 Pa. 49. 103 A. 541 (1918).
6 Act of April 26, 1855, P.L 328, 10 PS 13 (Pa.).
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to take; but the court shall supply a trustee and carry into effect the intent of the
donor. The statute allowed the doctrine to operate- in these situations. The next
act was passed in 1876,6 and it declared that if an estate vested in a trustee for
the purpose of applying the income for the benefit of a designated class of persons
and this class becomes extinct, then if there be no heirs, the court shall allow the
trustee to apply the income to some similar class of persons. This statute had little
effect, because of its provision making it applicable only if there are no heirs.
Usually cy pres is used to deprive the heirs.
It was the next statute that caused all the trouble. The legislature seemingly
desired to abolish cy pres and therefore passed the Act of 1885. 7 Without passing
an express repealer of the previous acts, the statute merely said that in disposition
of property by wvill for any religious, charitable, literary, or scientific purpose, if
the disposition is void for uncertainty, or the object be not ascertainable, or has
ceased to exist, or be an unlawful perpetuity, such property shall go to the heirs
of the decedent. This act by necessary implication repealed part of the Act of 1855,
but it dealt only with wills while the older act was not so limited. It also failed to
give property to the heirs in case the disposition be void by reason of the amount
being in excess of what the organization is allowed to take, or if void by reason
of the objects depending on the discretion of the last trustee. However, this latter
provision was probably repealed by the provision in the 1885 act that property was
to go to heirs if the objects be not ascertainable. If the objects of the charitable
trust depend on the trustee's appointing them as beneficiaries, and if he dies before
he appoints them, then it could be argued that the objects are not ascertainable.
On the other hand, a trust will not fail for want of a trustee, and the court could
appoint one to designate the charitable objects. At any rate it was for the court
to decide what parts of the former act were repealed by the latter.
Then the Act of 1889 was passed.8 It provided that no disposition of property
for religious or charitable uses shall fail for want of a trustee, or by reason of the
objects ceasing, or depending on the discretion of the last trustee, or being given
in perpetuity or in excess of the annual amount limited by law, but the court shall
supply a trustee and carry out the intention of the donor. It will be noted that
although this act did not expressly repeal the other statute, it did repeal some of
the provisions of the Act of 1885 by necessary implication. However, it did not
repeal provisions of that act relating to failure of the trust due to the objects being
unascertainable or uncertain (for some other reason than that they depend on the
discretion of the last trustee). Therefore, apparently, if a will devised property
for a purpose which became void because of uncertainty of the objects, the prop-
erty would go to the heirs. While if a similar disposition became void because of
the objects ceasing, it would be applied to some other objects under the cy pres
doctrine as put forth by the Act of 1889.
6 Act of May 26, 1876, P.L. 211, 10 PS 15 (Pa.).
7 Act of July 7, 1885, P.L. 259. 20 PS 196 (Pa.).
8 Act of May 9, 1839, P.L. 173, 10 PS 14 (Pa.).
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The final act was passed in 1895, 9 and was a substantial reenactment of the
Act of 1855 (the first of the series), there being only two minor additions. One
made the statute applicable to dispositions before the statute, and the other
allowed corporations not for profit to institute a suit by leave of the Attorney
General. The earlier statute gave this right to others but not to non-profit corpora-
tions.
From this brief examination of the statutes, it can readily be seen why it
has been so difficult for the courts to decide just what th legislature meant. Even
Chief Justice Sadler apparently overlooked the statute of 1889 when he stated,
"Starting with the Act of 1855, we find a fixed purpose of the legislature to
protect and conserve charitable bequests, though in conflict with the Rule against
Perpetuities, unless the same are void 'for uncertainty, or the object of the trust
be not ascertainable, or has ceased to exist.' in which case the estate reverts to the
next of kin by the terms of the Act of 1885." 10 The Act of 1889 stated that no
disposition of property shall fail because of the objects ceasing. The Act of 1855
and its amending act of 1895 said the same. A year later he recognized that the
Act of 1885 did change the earlier rule in certain cases, but that it was restored
in part by later legislation. 1
From an inspection of the statutes, it would seem, as pointed out above, that
if the trust failed because of the objects being uncertain, the property would go to
the heirs. This result would be reached if the statutes were construed according to
rules of construction announced in one case.1 2 Here the court said that the Act of
1895 did not have the effect of eliminating either the Act of 1885 or the Act of
1889, but that the amendment of 1895 would be qualified by both of these prior
statutes just as the Act of 1855 (act amended) was affected by them since there
was no absolute repugnancy between the new parts of the 1895 legislation and the
intermediate acts. When a statute merely reenacts the provisions of an earlier one,
it is to be read as part of the earlier statute and not of the reenacting one if it is
in conflict with another passed after the first but before the last act, and therefore
it does not repeal by implication the intermediate one. The intermediate act quali-
fies the new one in the same manner as it did the first one. This rule was put in
statutory form later.' 8
However, it seems as if this construction was not followed, because many
cases laid down the rule that gifts would be sustained over the objections that they
were void for uncertainty. 4 It should make no difference that some of these cases
9 Act of May 23, 1895, P.L. 114, 10 PS 13 (Pa.).
10 Hunter's Estate, 279 Pa. 349, 123 A. 865 (1924).
11 Thompson's Estate, 282 Pa. 30, 127 A. 446 (1925).
12 Toner's Estate, 260 Pa. 49, 103 A. 541 (1918).
19 Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1019, 46 PS 573, 571. (Pa.).
14 Jordan's Estate, 329 Pa. 427, 197 A. 150 (1938); Thompson's Estate, 282 Pa. 30, 127 A.
446 (1925) ; Kimberly's Estate (No. 1), 249 Pa. 469, 95 A. 82 (1915); Dulles's Estate, 218 Pa.
162, 67 A. 49 (1907); Daly's Estate, 208 Pa. 58, 57 A. 180 (1904) ; In re Murphy's Estate, 184
Pa. 310, 39 A, 70 (1898).
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were also cases where there was no trustee. Even when a trustee is appointed, the
objects are still uncertain. However, here another conflict of statutes arises, and it
is possible that the Act of 1889 could have sustained these decisions where there
was no trustee in addition to uncertain objects. That act said that if there were no
trustee, the court should appoint one to carry out the intent of the donor (ap-
parently whether the objects were uncertain or not). At any rate there was a con-
flict whether the uncertainty should give the gift to the heirs or whether the lack
of a trustee should allow the court to appoint another trustee to carry out the intent
of the testator where the statute gave the courts this power but said nothing about
uncertainty.
Perhaps these cases can be explained in another manner. In spite of the ob-
scurity and inconclusiveness of the five inconsistent statutes, the courts have been
guided by one bright star. This is the policy of the law to protect and preserve
charities since they are favorites of the law.15 This light has enabled the courts to
sustain gifts to charities in almost all cases. Unfortunately, clouds of confusion oc-
casionally caused the courts to lose sight of this star. In one case,18 the testatrix
created a trust for her sister for life and on her death to a trustee for charitable
uses. The trustee predeceased the sister and did not designate charities to benefit.
The court held that the death of the trustee put beyond possibility the distribution
of the fund as he alone was to name the beneficiaries. Thus the testatrix was intes-
tate as to the remainder, and it went to the sister who then had a fee. The trust
was dissolved. Courts have repeatedly held that a trust will not fail for want of
a trustee,17 nor because of uncertainty of objects,' 8 nor because of the failure of
the last trustee. 19 In these latter cases, courts repeatedly appoint new trustees to
perform duties which the appointed trustee never accomplished. There was even
some evidence of the testatrix's intent as to charities to be selected, because the
last trustee had a tentative memo as to what he might do in designating bene-
ficiaries. There was no indication in the case as reported that the testatrix indicated
that only the designated trustee could appoint beneficiaries. If she did not do this,
it seems that her intent should not have been thwarted merely because the trustee
died without performing his duty. Since her intent was charitable, it cannot be
said that the named trustee was the only one who could designate the beneficiaries.
A charitable intent cannot be limited to what one man as trustee may desire if he
dies before he expresses his desire. If this were allowed, a trustee could purposely
refrain from choosing the charities which are to benefit; thus if he died first, he
1 Hunter's Estate, 279 Pa. 349, 123 A. 865 (1924); Unruh's Estate, 248 Pa. 185, 93 A.
1000 (1915); Daly's Estate, 208 Pa. 58, 57 A. 180 (1904).
16 Farrell's Estate, 38 D. & C. 238 (1940).
17 Thompson's Estate, 282 Pa. 30, 127 A. 446 (1925) ; Stevens's Estate, 200 Pa. 318, 49 A.
985 (1901); Frazier v. St. Luke's Church, 147 Pa, 256, 23 A. 442 (1892).
18 Cases cited note 14 supra.
19 Thompson's Estate, 282 Pa. 30, 127 A. 446 (1925); Anderson's Estate, 269 Pa. 535, 112
A. 766 (1921); De Silver's Estate, 211 Pa. 459, 60 A. 1048 (1905); Stevens's Estate, 200 Pa.
318, 49 A. 985 (1901); FOULKE, RULES AGAINST PERPETUITIES 422 ff. (1909).
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would not only deprive charity but also defeat the testator's clear intent. He would
in effect be denying the testator the right to dispose of his property as he wishes.
This is in the nature of a breach of trust and such will not cause a reverter.20
In all of the uncertainty in the law above, one thing is certain. There were
many difficult decisions for the courts to make, and the inconsistent statutes made
this trying job even harder. As one authority commented on the previous statutes,
"Thle provisions of the acts relating to cy pres are so obscure and the authorities
are so meagre that no definite conclusions can be drawn as to the law."21
Keeping the five statutes in mind, one can determine from them, and from
the cases interpreting them, what elements in general are necessary for the courts
to apply the cy pres doctrine. The first condition is that there be a charitable pur-
pose. An early case stated, "It is the doctrine of approximation, and it is not at
all confined to administration of charities but is equally applicable to all devises
and contracts wherein the future is provided for, and it is an essential element of
equity jurisprudence." 22 As a later case pointed out, though, this statement was
dicta, and there are no known cases applying the doctrine where the use is not
literary, scientific, religious, or charitab1l-. 2 At any rate, the statutes limited the
doctrine to those four uses, some limiting it to the latter two only. The latter two
can no doubt be considered as including the former two. Other authorities and
cases limit the use of the doctrine to charitable purposes.2 ' Ordinarily the doctrine
is applied only to gifts by will.2 5 This is not the case in Pennsylvania. 26 The re-
pealed statutes provided that "dispositions of property" shall not fail (except Act
of 1885 which applied to wills only), and the Estates Act of 1947 provides that the
doctrine should apply when "an interest shall be conveyed." Obviously these do
not limit the doctrine to cases involving dispositions by wills.
What is charitable could be the subject of a treatise in itself.2 7 A look at a
few cases, however, will give a good idea. In Jackson v. Philips,2 8 the following
definition was enunciated:
"A charity, in a legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift to
be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite
number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the
influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease,
suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in life,
20 Norton's Appeal, 312 Pa. 239, 167 A. 341 (1933); Restatement, Trusts, i 401 (a) (1935);
3 SCOTT. TRUSTS 2124 (1939).
21 FOULKE, op. cit. supra note 19, at 476.
22 Philadelphia v. Heirs of Girard, 45 Pa. 9 (1863).
23 Davis's Estate, 23 Dist. R. 768 (1914).
24 White's Estate, 340 Pa. 92, 16 A.2d 394 (1940) ; In re Stephan's Estate, 129 Pa. Super. 396,
195 A. 653 (1937); Restatement, Trusts, I 399 (a) (1935); FOULKE, op, cit. supra note 19,
at 476; 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS 2082.
26 FOULKE, op. cit. supra note 19, at 476.
26 Ibid.; Commonwealth v. Pauline Home, 141 Pa. 537, 21 A. 661 (1891).
27 Restatement, Trusts. 0 368 to 374 (1935) ; FOULKE, op. cit. supra note 19, at 431 ff.
28 96 Mass. 539 (1867).
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or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works, or otherwise
lessening the burden of government."
This definition has been quoted in several Pennsylvania cases.20 Another
definition often quoted in cases is, "A charitable use, where neither law nor
public policy forbids, may be applied to almost anything that tends to promote
the well-doing and well-being of social man." 80
There seems to be a tendency to broaden the technical meaning of the word
"charitable" and to make it more inclusive. In a recent case,$' the testatrix gave
the residue to a "worthy cause or institution," and the court advanced the idea
that, "With these necessarily vague conceptions of what constitute a 'charity' in a
legal .sense it would seem that there is not, at best, an absolute criterion for dis-
tinguishing between such words as 'charitable', 'benevolent', 'worthy' and the like,
when used by a testator to designate the class of institutions from which his bene-
ficiaries are to be selected." In this case the court held that "worthy" as used by the
testatrix was meant by her to refer only to an institution which would fall within
the legal definition of a charity. The Restatement of Trusts discusses charitable
purposes and the following was approved in a fairly recent case:
82
"The common element of all charitable purposes is that they are
designed to accomplish objects which are beneficial to the community.
... A purpose is charitable if its accomplishment is of such social interest
to the community as to justify permitting the property to be devoted to
the purpose in perpetuity. . ... There is no fixed standard to determine
what purposes are of such social interest to the community; the interests
of the community vary with time and place." 3
The Estates Act of 1947 helps very little. In § 1 (1), it lays down the fol-
lowing:
" 'Charity' or 'charitable purposes' includes but is not limited to the
relief of poverty, the advancement of education, the advancement of
religion, the promotion of health, governmental or municipal purposes,
and other purposes the accomplishment of which is beneficial to the
community."
This is the definition of the Restatement § 368 plus the words "but is not limited
to."
From these definitions, it can readily be seen that the word "charity" includes
many things. A look at a few things it does not include may be helpful. It mat-
29 Taylor v. Hoag, 273 Pa. 194, 116 A. 826 (1922) ; Centennial and Memorial Association of
Valley Forge, 235 Pa. 206, 83 A. 683 (1912) ; Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624, 15
A. 553 (1888).
80 Tollinger Estate, 349 Pa. 393, 37 A.2d 500 (1944); Thompson's Estate, 282 Pa. 30, 127
A. 446 (1925) ; Taylor v. Hoag, 273 Pa. 194, 116 A. 826 (1922) ; Barnwell's Estate, 269 Pa. 443,
112 A. 535 (1920) ; Centennial and Memorial Association of Valley Forge, 235 Pa. 206, 83 A.
683 (1912).
31 Funk Estate, 353 Pa. 321, 45 A.2d 67 (1946).
82 Ibid.; Tollinger Estate, 349 Pa. 393, 37 A.2d 500 (1944).
3s Restatement, Trusts, § 368 (a) (b) (1935).
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ters not what was the motive of the donor. It made no difference that the testator
wanted a memorial monument or arch with a bronze statue of himself and a play-
house, containing a name plate, for children in a playground. 84 A Fire Insurance
Patrol, the purpose of which was to savt life and property, was no less charitable
merely because it was supported by voluntary contributions of fire insurance com-
panies and aided their businessAs8 Also, it did not matter that the motive of an
erection of a window in a church in memory of a father and containing an inscrip-
tion to that effect might be said by some to be somewhat non-charitable. It was
a memorial in a church and therefore charitable. The test of public charity is not
the motive of the donor but the object or purpsoe to be attained.38 It is interesting
to note, however, that a bequest for a statue of testatrix's deceased husband and
a memorial window to his memory to be placed in Allegheny County Memorial
Hall in honor of soldiers, sailors, and marines of that county, which failed because
the husband had not enlisted from that county, was not given elsewhere under
cy pres because the legacy was not for a religious or charitable use.3 7 Then too, it
must not be assumed that all bequests to charitable institutions are for charitable
purposes or create charitable trusts. In White's Estate, 8 the testatrix, who while
living had made arrangements with an institution to care for her daughter after
her death, made bequests to charitable institutions as "compensation" for main-
tenance of her daughter at the institution. The institution renounced the benefits
of the will and refused to take the child. The child wcent to another home, and
the court ordered the amount to be paid for her care. She died and the heirs claim
the excess. The court agreed with the heirs that the testatrix contracted with the
home to care for her daughter and that there was no charitable gift intended. The
daughter was not thought of as being subject to charity. A charitable trust is not
created metely because one of the parties to a contract is a charitable institution and
consideration is to be paid under the contract to the institution.
Trusts for the care and upkeep of cemeteries and monuments had been, by
statutory enactment, declared to be made for charitable uses.3 9 One case held that
under the statute a bequest "for the keeping of my lot in the cemetery" was for a
charitable use. Therefore, the amount of the bequest that was in excess of the needs
for her lot was given for the care of the rest of the cemetery which needed attention.
Beautification of other parts of the cemetery contributed to the sightliness of her
lot.40 Despite this case, a later lower court held under substantially the same facts
that the bequest was not charitable within the meaning necessary for the cy pres
doctrine to apply. The distinguishing feature was that here the rest of the cemetery
84 Smith's Estate, 181 Pa. 109, 37 A. 114 (1897).
35 Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624, 15 A. 553 (1888).
86 Becker's Estate, 28 District Reports 695 (1919).
87 Davis's Estate, 23 District Reports 768 (1914).
38 White's Estate, 340 Pa. 92, 16 A.2d 394 (1940).
89 Act of May 26, 1891. P.L 119, 9 PS 4. (Pa.).
40 Neely's Estate, 288 Pa. 130, 135 A. 540 (1927).
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needed no care." Under this law, such trusts were not considered to be charitable
within the meaning of the statute invalidating bequests made to charities within
thirty days of the death of the testator, 42 nor for memorials out of cemetery lots,4
nor for provisions for head and foot tombstones. 44 To avoid this confusion as to
whether such trusts were charitable or not, the Estates Act merely says that such
trusts are not void as a perpetuity.
45
There has been some attempt to distinguish between gifts in fee to a charitable
corporation for its purpose and gifts to a charitable corporation as trustee for
specific purposes. The contention was that cy pres is applied only to charitable
trusts as such and not to gifts to charitable corporations. Some decisions make this
distinction, but not for the purpose of applying the cypres doctrine. The difference
is admitted in cases involving questions of who has legal and equitable title. If
the corporation is trustee for specific purposes, it has not the equitable title. There-
fore, the court may deprive it of the trust property, 46 or prevent it from ending the
trust to get the property. 47 Another case made this distinction seemingly to avoid
the Act of 1885 when it held that only gifts for charitable purposes were declared
void by that statute and not gifts to a charitable corporation.' 8 For purposes of
applying the doctrine of cy pres, th'ere seems to be no doubt that there is no dif-
ference. Some cases use the theory that the corporation is the trustee for the bene-
fit of others.49 Other cases point out that the corporation is a trustee for itself
holding property for purposes specified in the gift, and that it is a trust in the
sense that the fund does not merge into the general property of the corporation
but remains under the jurisdiction of the court of equity.50 Another and more
realistic approach is that if a corporation is created for charitable purposes only,
bequests to it are for those purposes only and cannot be used for another purpose,
and therefore there is really no distinction. 1 Other authorities agree.52 In actuality,
the corporation, although owning the property completely, cannot do with it en-
tirely as it pleases; it holds the property for the use of others. Under the latest
enactment, the use of the word "trust" is avoided, and the statute merely declares
that "if the charitable purpose for which an interest shall be conveyed shall" not
be able to be fulfilled, the court may administer cy pres.58 There can be no doubt
now that the doctrine applies in both cases.
41 Devereux's Estate, 48 D. & C. 491 (1943).
42 Deaner's Estate, 98 Pa. Super. 360 (1929).
48 In re Stephan's Estate, 129 Pa. Super. 396, 195 A. 653 (1937).
44 Wise v. Rupp, 269 Pa. 505, 112 A. 548 (1921).
45 Estates Act of 1947, 1 4 (b) (2).
46 Lehigh University v. Hower, 159 Pa. Super. 84, 46 A.2d 516 (1946).
47 Unruh's Estate, 248 Pa. 185, 93 A. 1000 (1915).
48 McCully's Estate, 269 Pa. 122, 112 A. 159 (1920).
49 Commonwealth v. Pauline Home, 141 Pa. 537, 21 A. 661 (1891).
60 Craig Estate, 356 Pa. 564, 52 A.2d-650 (1947).
51 Kortright's Estate (No. 2), 237 Pa. 143, 85 A. 111 (1912).
62 Restatement, Trusts, § 399 (a) (j) (1935); FOULKE, op. cit. supra note 19, at 478; 3
SCOTT, TRUSTS 2075 ff.; 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 2187 ff. (1935).
63 Estates Act of 1947, 9 10.
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The second major element necessary, after a charitable purpose is discovered,
is that there must be a failure of the primary purpose of the donor. This failure
may result from any number of causes. The prior statutes, as reviewed above,
enumerated a number of these causes of failures in which the cy pres doctrine
would apply. Under these, a charitable trust did not fail for want of a trustee,
and the court appointed one to carry out the duties of a trustee.
54 Also under the
old acts, a disposition of property did not fail because of its being in excess of the
amount the charters authorized the organization to hold.55 Likewise, when the
failure of the primary purpose of the donor was due to the objects ceasing
56 or
being uncertain, 51 cy pres saved the gift for charity. Nor did the charitable intent
of the testatrix fail because of insufficient funds to establish a charitable home
she desired.5 8 Where the trustee which the testator appointed failed to name the
beneficiaries, the charitable trust did not fail bcause of the failure of the last
trustee.59 The next of kin gained nothing when the funds, which were in excess
of the amount necessary for the named purpose, were awarded cy pres.
60
If the purpose of the donor should fail because of an illegal element, other
problems arise. If a testator willed property to educate pick pockets, the purpose
is illegal and obviously the cy pres doctrine would not apply. It can hardly be
imagined that this would be a charitable bequest. Certainly it does not benefit the
community. However, the illegal element may be an unlawful condition, limitation,
power, or restraint annexed to a lawful pupose. In this situation, the unlawful
condition, limitation, power, restraint, and the estates limited thereon would be
void while the principal or vested estate remains.
61
The charitable trust may fail because it violates a statute. Where charitable
trusts violated the former statutes62 which declared such trusts void if they were
made within a month of the death of the testator or if they were not witnessed
by two disinterested witnesses, the courts properly declared the trusts void and
awarded the property to the heirs rather than under the cy pres power.
63 If the
statute voided gifts to charity because made too soon before death of the testator,
and if the courts awarded that gift to another charity under the cy pres power, the
54 Cases cited note 17 supra.
55 Darlington's Estate, 289 Pa. 297, 137 A. 268 (1927) ; Kortright's Estate (No. 2), 237 Pa.
143, 85 A. 111 (1912).
66 Craig Estate, 356 Pa. 564, 52 A.2d 650 (1947); Wilkey's Estate, 337 Pa. 129, 10 A.2d
425 (1940); Hoff's Estate, 315 Pa. 286, 172 A. 645 (1934); Toner's Estate, 260 Pa. 49, 103 A.
541 (1918).
17 Cases cited note 14 aupra.
68 Williams Estate, 353 Pa. 638, 46 A.2d 237 (1946).
69 Cases cited note 19 supra.
90 Neely's Estate, 288 Pa. 130. 135 A. 549 (1927).
61 Philadelphia v. Heirs of Girard, 45 Pa. 9 (1863).
62 Act of April 26, 1855, P.L. 328, 10 PS 12 (Pa.) ; Act of June 7, 1917, P.L 403, 20 PS
195 (Pa.).
63 Crozer's Estate 296 Pa. 48, 145 A. 697 (1929) ; Palethorp's Estate, 249 Pa. 389, 94 A. 1060
(1915) ; Arnold's Estate, 249 Pa. 348, 94 A, 1076 (1915); Anderson's Estate, 243 Pa. 34, 89 A.
306 (1914); Kessler's Estate, 221 Pa. 341, 70 A. 770 (1908); Lynch v. Lynch, 132 Pa. 422, 19
A. 281 (1890).
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statute would become a nullity. This is one case where cy pres cannot apply when
the trust fails because of illegality. The Restatement of Trusts § 399 states that
if "it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the particular
purpose" cy pres will apply. This section was quoted with approval in a recent
case, but that case did not deal with any illegal element.6 4 The present statute does
not purport to deal with the possibility of illegality. However, as pointed out above,
there would be very few times, if any, when the courts would be justified in
applying cy pres when the purpose failed because of illegality.
The present legislation deals with all the situations enumerated in the previous
statutes. It says that "if the charitable purpose . . . becomes indefinite or impos-
sible or impractical of fulfillment, or if it shall not have been carried out for
want of a trustee or because of the failure of a trustee to designate such purpose,"
the court may apply the gift cy pres. It is submitted that this statute includes all
of the possibilities mentioned in the repealed statutes and possibly some contin-
gencies not there mentioned since the language is phrased broadly. Instead of
listing isolated cases where cy pres will be applied, it uses such general terms as
"indefinite or impossible or impractical." These terms include at least the afore-
mentioned causes of failure and could include others not presently brought to mind.
The third element necessary for cy pres to operate under the old law was
a general charitable intent of the donor besides the specific named purpose.65 The
statutes did not speak of a general intent as such, but they inferred as much when
they stated that the courts should carry into effect the intent of the donor when
the disposition failed. This "intent" could only be a bigger, more general charit-
able intent than the specific, named purpose; for if the specific intent failed, it
would be useless for the legislature to give the courts power to carry out that
specific intent which has already failed. The statute's "intent" undoubtedly re-
ferred to the general charitable intent that the courts talked about. Although this
element was invariably declared to be necessary, the courts seldom had any trouble
finding it. Because of the tendency of the courts to apply cy pres whenever pos-
sible, the legislature in the 1947 act abolished entirely the necessity of finding any
general intent. It specifically points out that the doctrine will apply "whether his
charitable intent be general or specific." All that is necessary is that he have a
charitable intent to start with and that he has made no alternative gift. This phrase
was added to provide for the application of cy pres in the situation where the
courts might say that the donor did not intend to provide for any charitable pur-
pose but the stated one. In some cases in other jurisdictions this was the result.6 6
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Even though these three elements were present, the courts would not apply
the doctrine if the donor annexed to his gift a condition and a reverter.67 It seems
unconscionable for the court to say that it is applying the gift according to the
donor's general charitable intent (to some other charitable object) when his
express intent was to dispose of the property elsewhere on failure of his first
named donee to take or on failure of the trust for some other reason. Apparently
this was never done in Pennsylvania, but it has been allowed in other jurisdic-
tions.68 If there is a condition only with no reverter, the situation is more difficult.
There are cases saying that since a condition was not met, the gift must fall into
th'e residue of the estate.6 9 In one case, however, the testator desired to create a
trust to provide for courses in eugenics at Harvard; the school refused to provide
the courses. The court said the trust was for the general good and not for the
benefit of a particular institution; therefore, the trust was not defeated and
tht court appointed an institution to carry out the testator's intention.7 0 In another
case, where the bequest was to go to a university in the event of its establishing
certain courses, the lower court thought the condition was satisfied and gave the
bequest to the legatee. Later the trustees petitioned the court to get back the money
because of failure of the university to perform the condition. In granting the
request of the trustees, the court said that conditions precedent to testamentary
gifts must be strictly and literally complied with. It also pointed out that cy pres
did not apply, because a charity is not created unless the condition of its creation is
performed. This case explained that the previous case awarded the bequest cy pres
because realization of a charitable design did not depend on a condition." 1 In still
another case, money was to go to a university for a building, but this provision
was conditioned on the university providing and setting apart a piece of land as
a site for the building. In event the university did not comply, the trustees were
to contract with other colleges, but the trustees died without making other ar-
rangements. The court said that even though the condition might not be carried
out, the estate vested for a charitable purpose and therefore it did not matter where
it was carried out. The university was named as a trustee. 72 The court went out
of its way to point out how a condition in a will, which provided that the income
was to be used to promote higher education of females in an institution in or adja-
cent to Philadelphia, was met by giving the income to Wilson College in Chambers-
burg, 156 miles from Philadelphia.
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Sometimes the testator uses "condition" when he really intends to impose a
duty to apply the property to a particular purpose rather than a condition. How-
ever, if there is a true condition, the property reverts even though the testator says
nothing about reverter. 74 There must be an intention to create a condition. If
property is conveyed to be used for a charitable purpose forever or for such pur-
poses only, no condition is created. If property is given "upon condition" that it
be applied to certain charitable purposes, a charitable trust is created, and unl'ss
there is a reverter the instrument imposes no condition. The property will not
revert if it is not applied for the specific purposes named."6 Where the property
is in trust to be applied to charitable purposes so long as a certain state of affairs
continues or until a certain event happens, the charitable trust ends when the state
of affairs ceases, and a trust results for the settlor or his heirs unless there is a
valid gift over.76 If property is given upon a legal condition subsequent, the trust
will end upon the happening of the condition." When the condition subsequent
is illegal, the condition is invalid but the charitable trust is valid. g Where a
condition precedent is illegal, either the charitable trust will not arise when the
event happens, or the condition will fail and the trust arise even though the event
has not happened, the result depending on the intention of the testator. 9 It is
believed that thest rules will apply under the 1947 enactment. The act says nothing
about conditions; it merely states that "except as otherwise provided by the con-
veyor," cy pres may apply. If there is a reverter on failure of the charitable pur-
pose, or if there is a true condition, the application of cy pres is precluded. How-
ever, if the conveyance is made "upon condition" that it be applied to certain
charitable purposes, this should not be a provision preventing cy pres from oper-
ating; rather it should be construed as imposing a duty on the trustee to carry out
that purpose if possible, and if not, then as applicable under the cy pres power,
If thtse four elements are present, then the courts are ready to apply the
cy pres doctrine, but someone must bring the matter to the attention of the court.
Originally, this was provided for in the Act of 1855 where the "Attorney General
of tht Commonwealth, on relation of any institution, association, or individual,
desirous of carrying such disposition into effect, and willing to become responsible
for the costs thereof" shall institute the action. As amended in 1895, a corporation
not for profit could also be the relator. Tht Act of 1889 provided for no method
of suit, merely setting forth the duty of the court to carry out the intent of the
donor. The courts have always held that the Attorney General at the relation of
another must bring the suit rather than the heirs.s 0
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The Act of 1889 made no provision as to who should sue. In event of a
situation arising under that Act, thL court merely was to issue a decree to carry
out the intent of the donor. This Act did not apply to a failure of a trust because
of uncertainties of the objects. This may account for a charitable trust failure in
a lower court case. 81 In that case, the testatrix left money to found a home for
aged men in honor of her brother. World War II made prices high and materials
scarce, so there was not enough money to build such a home. In spite of the fact
that Justice Stern in a previous case 82 said that the Act of 1885 was so devitalized
as to make it negligible, the lower court pointed out that the Act of 1855 was not
repealed and had sufficient vitality to apply to this case. Thus the will was void
because of uncertainty and because the objects of the trust were not ascertainable.
This was not a case of the Attorney General bringing the suit on relation of some
charitable institution, and since the objects were uncertain, the Act of 1889 did not
apply, nor did the Act of 1895, but the Act of 1885 giving property to the heirs
did apply. The court said there was no intent to give for a charitable purpose but
only for perpetuation of her brother's name. This does not seem to be a valid
conclusion. The court applied statutes relating to charitable bequests, and it is hard
to see how there can be a charitable bequest without a charitable purpose. Maybe
testatrix had no charitable motive, but even the court admitted that this did not
matter. Certainly a home for aged men is beneficial to the community, and this is
true even though the motive may be to perpetuate her brother's name. As stated
before, charitable bequests do not fail because of uncertainty of the objects. In
those cases, the uncertainty was due to lack of specific named beneficiaries; here
the uncertainty was due to impracticability because the object was not ascertainable,
and apparently another charitable institution could become the beneficiary only as
relator of the Attorney General. Certainly, thL testatrix did have a charitable
intent, and it seems wrong to circumvent this intent. Admittedly it was difficult
to interpret the maze of statutes, It is hoped that the 1947 Act will prevent such
decisions. It states, "The court may, on application of the trustee or of any in-
terested person or of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth, after proof of
notice to the Attoney General when he is not the petitioner . . ." apply the estate
cy pres. Notice that now the charitable institution is not required to find out
about thL failure of the trust and apply for the benefit. It may do so as an interested
person, but the trustee may also ask the court what to do with the estate. All that
is necessary is that the trustee or interested person notify thL Attorney General.
This is a much more practical provisicm than the former one.
When the proper case is before the court, it has the duty to apply the gift
cy pres, meaning as near as possible to the intent of the conveyor. Usually there
is not much doubt as to what charity is a reasonable approximation of the con-
vwyor's desire. Thus, where funds were subscribed to supply comfort kits and per-
81 Hildebrand's Estate, 47 D. & C. 537 (1943).
82 Wilkey's Estate, 337 Pa. 129, 10 A.2d 425 (1940).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
sonal necessities to draftees of World War I and there was an unexpended balance,
the erection of a permanent memorial honoring service mn was not the closest
approximation practicable to the original plan. Since there was a new draft taking
place, the balance was applied to the same purposes for service men of World War
II.81 In a recent decision, the court awarded the assets of a non-sectarian hospital,
which because of financial trouble stopped its corporate purposes and submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of the court, to an Episcopal hospital which although
sectarian did not discriminate. At the same time the court recognized that the
judgment of the court cannot be substituted capriciously for that of the testator,
and even though the funds had been given to the original hospital for its non-
sectarian purposes, the Supreme Court held that there was no abuse of discretion
by the lower court. A dissent pointed out that the non-sectarian hospital received
state aid; therefore, the funds should not be awarded to a sectarian hospital when
there are non-sectarian hospitals qualified.84 Although the courts exercised the
power of cy pres, the Act of 1855 and its amendment, the Act of 1895, in rather
obscure language set forth the law that if the events enumerated there which would
cause failures of charitable trusts took place (objects ceasing, unascertainable, etc.),
"such disposition, so far as exceeding the power of the courts to determine the
same by the rules of law or equity, shall be taken to have been made subject to be
further regulated and disposed of by the legislature of this Commonwealth, in man-
ner as nearly in conformity with the intent of the donor or testator, and the rules
of law against perpetuities, as practicable, or otherwise to accrue to the public
treasury for public use." Thus the legislature could have administered the doctrine,
and the gift might have been given to the public treasury. No case is known
where these possibilities have happened. The provision was confusing, and one
case in dicta said that the Act of 1885 did not change the cy pres power of the courts
but merely reprealed the power assumed by the legislature tinder the Act of 1855.85
At any rate this is no problem today. The Estates Act provides that "the court may
order an administration or distribution of the estate for a charitable purpose
in a manner as nearly as possible to fulfill the intention of the conveyor." The
legislature has no authority to dispose of property now; the court makes the dis-
position as it sees fit.
To summarize the elements necessary for the application of the cy pres
doctrine today, the first necessity is that the conveyor have a charitable purpose.
The 1947 Act does not change the previous law on this point. Second, this pur-
pose must fail because of a reason mentioned in the Estates Act. Reasons enumer-
ated in this Act include all possibilities existing in previous statutes, and because
of the broad language, may take care of other eventualities. Third, the conveyor
must not have provided otherwise. How'ever, a general charitable intent is no
83 Connors v. Ahearn, 342 Pa. 5, 19 A.2d 388 (1941).
84 Kensington Hospital for Women Case, 358 Pa. 458, 58 A.2d 154 (1948).
85 Trim's Estate, 168 Pa. 395, 31 A. 1071 (1895).
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longer needed. It does not matter that the court feels that the conveyor intended
the gift for this one purpose only. Fourth, an interested person must make applica-
tion to the court and notify the Attorney General. When these elements are present,
the courts may distribute the estate for some other charitable purpose which is
similar to the expressed purpose of the conveyor.
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